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Abstract
This article examines how rms facing volatile input prices and holding some
degree of market power in their product market link their risk management
with their production or pricing strategies. This issue is relevant in many
industries ranging from manufacturing to energy retailing, where risk averse
rms decide on their hedging strategies before their product market strategies.
We nd that hedging modies the pricing and production strategies of rms.
This strategic e¤ect is channelled through the risk-adjusted expected cost, i.e.,
the expected marginal cost under the measure induced by shareholdersrisk
aversion. It has diametrically opposed impacts depending on the nature of
product market competition: hedging toughens quantity competition while
it softens price competition. Finally, committing to a hedging strategy is
always a best response to non committing, and is a dominant strategy if rms
compete à la Hotelling.
Keywords: Risk management, Imperfect Competition
JEL Classication: L13, G32
1 Introduction
Most formal analyses of corporate risk management decisions (for example
Froot and Stein (1998), Rochet and Villeneuve (2011), and Bolton, Chen
and Wang (2011)) describe a single price-taking rm that faces volatile cash
ows and optimizes its mix of reserves (cash or debt capacity) and derivatives
instruments (forward and options).
In many instances, this analysis constitutes a valid representation of real-
ity. Firms producing commodities and raw materials (e.g., metals and min-
erals, oil and gas, electric power) face output price volatility that translates
directly into cash ow volatility. In many industries, such as manufacturing,
food processing, transportation, and energy retailing, rms face input price,
not output price, volatility. When rms have no market power in their prod-
uct market, the single-rm risk management logic applies. Individual hedging
demand from these price-taking rms can then be aggregated to determine
the equilibrium price of risk (for example, Bessembinber and Lemmon (2002),
and Aid et al. (2011)).
If, however, rms facing input price volatility have some degree of market
power in their product market, their strategies become more elaborate. For
example, a rm can pass through to customers a portion of the input cost
increase and/or can retain a portion of the input cost decrease. However,
by modifying product price, the rm alters the competitive dynamics in its
industry. It must therefore take into account the behavior of other rms, and
the pass-through is determined in equilibrium.
The British electric power retailing sector provides a clear example of
the strategic aspects of hedging. The British regulator (Ofgem (2008), page
10) indicates that: "there is evidence that the (6 largest suppliers) seek to
benchmark their hedging strategies against each other in order to minimize
the risk of their wholesale costs diverging materially from the competition".
Suppliers then play a symmetric Nash equilibrium. What matters to them is
not the absolute value of their hedging position, but its value relative to their
competitors.
This article examines how hedging interacts with product market strat-
egy when rms compete in quantity (Cournot) and in price (di¤erentiated
Bertrand).
There is a small academic literature on the strategic aspects of hedging.
Closest to this work, Allaz and Villa (1993) examine the interplay of forward
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and spot markets, and nd that the availability of forward contracts reduces
rmsmarket power in the spot market. However, their analysis di¤ers from
ours in a critical aspect: in their setting, rms sell their output on the forward
or spot markets, where they exert market power, while in ours, rms exert no
market power in the spot and forward markets for input. Adam, Dasgupta,
and Titman (2007) examine two-period games in the presence of nancial
constraints: rms hedging decision in the rst-period a¤ects their invest-
ment capacity, hence their protability in the second period. They show that
asymmetric equilibria arise: in equilibrium, some rms hedge, while others
do not. In their model, the presence of nancial constraints and the resulting
potential underinvestment is the conduit for strategic interaction. Similarly,
Loss (2012) examines the interaction between hedging demand and the char-
acteristics of investment opportunities in the presence of nancial constraints.
He nds that a rms hedging demand is high when investments are strategic
substitutes, and low when they are strategic complements. In this article, by
contrast, pricing and hedging are part of the same strategy. Bodnar, Dumas,
and Marston (2002) consider a duopoly with asymmetric exposure to an ex-
change rate, and determine the optimal pass-through and related exposure.
While the problem is related to the one examined here, the analytical ap-
proach is very di¤erent: they treat the exchange rate as a xed input price,
not as a stochastic variable. This articles contribution is therefore to analyze
the strategic interactions between product market and hedging decisions of
large corporations.
We focus the analysis on risk-averse rms that hedge before deciding their
product market strategies. The empirical relevance of this choice is justied
in Section 2. Formally, we use two-stage games: rms rst determine their
hedging strategy, then determine their product market strategy (quantity or
price), conditional on their rst stage choice.
We rst analyze quantity competition. The necessary rst-order condi-
tions characterizing the equilibrium of the production game are similar to
the standard Cournot case, except that risk-adjusted expected costs replace
marginal costs. Investors value a marginal cost increase using the probabil-
ity measure induced by their marginal utility of wealth in each state of the
world, and not the physical probability measure. This risk-adjusted expected
marginal cost is determined in equilibrium. It is decreasing in own hedging,
and increasing in own production at the equilibrium. Thus, if a rm increases
its hedging, it becomes more aggressive (Lemma 2).
2
An equilibrium of the production game always exists. If the variation in
rms absolute risk aversion remains small (this statement is made precise
in Section 5), this equilibrium is unique, and an increase in own hedging
reduces the other rms equilibrium output (Proposition 1). If a symmetric
equilibrium of the hedging game exists, and the variation in rmsabsolute
risk aversion remains small, hedging toughens quantity competition: rms
hedge more than their (anticipated) equilibrium production, thus commit
themselves to produce more than if their costs were constant and equal to the
expected cost under the physical probability measure (Proposition 2).
We establish similar results for di¤erentiated price competition, although
with diametrically opposed implications. Risk-adjusted expected marginal
costs, determined in equilibrium, replace constant marginal costs in the rst-
order conditions characterizing the equilibrium of the pricing game. They are
decreasing in own hedging and decreasing in own price at the equilibrium.
Thus, if a rm increases its hedging, it becomes more aggressive (Lemma 3).
An equilibrium of the pricing game always exists. If absolute risk aversion
is constant, the equilibrium is unique, and an increase in own hedging re-
duces the other rms equilibrium price. The crucial di¤erence with quantity
competition is that, if a symmetric equilibrium of the hedging game exists
and absolute risk aversion is constant, hedging softens quantity competition:
rms hedge less than their (anticipated) equilibrium production, thus commit
themselves to a price higher than if their cost was constant and equal to the
expected cost under the physical probability measure (Proposition 3).
For ease of exposition, the unicity and comparative statics results when
rms compete in quantity are derived under the strong condition that risk
aversion is constant. A weaker su¢ cient condition is that the variation of
rmsabsolute risk aversion remains small (Proposition 4).
Finally, we examine the strategic incentives to commit to a hedging posi-
tion (Proposition 5). Sofar, we have assumed that Boards of Directors impose
that rms commit to their hedging position. This is usually meant to limit
speculation by traders. Ignoring that objective, does commitment arise in
equilibrium? We rst prove that committing is a rms best response to
the other not committing. This result is all the more striking that both
rms committing is Pareto dominated if rms compete in quantity. On the
other hand, if rms compete in price, commitment to a hedging strategy soft-
ens price competition. If total demand is inelastic (Hotelling competition)
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and absolute risk aversion constant, the expected gain in prots more than
compensates the volatility increase, and commitment is a dominant strategy.
Thus, whether rms compete in quantity or in price, they have a strategic
incentive to commit to their hedging decisions.
This article is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Sec-
tion 3 analyzes quantity competition. Section 4 analyzes price competition.
Section 5 discusses robustness of the results. Section 6 examines incentives
to commit to hedging decisions. Finally, Section 7 discusses further research.
Technical proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2 The model
2.1 Demand and commercial prots
Consider two identical rms, indexed by i = 1; 2, competing à la Cournot.
Firm i produces output qi, total production is Q = q1 + q2, and inverse
demand P (Q). To produce one unit of good, both rms use one unit of the
same input, at cost ~c. Firm is commercial prots for input cost ~c is:
C (qi; qj ; ~c) = qi (P (Q)  ~c) :
Assumption 1 For all Q  0, the inverse demand function P (:) satises
QP 00 (Q)
( P 0 (Q)) < 1 (1)
and
lim
Q!1
A (Q) = 0 and lim
Q!0
A (Q) = lim
Q!0
P (Q) = +1
where
A (Q) = 2P (Q) +QP
0
(Q) :
2.2 Deterministic input cost
Before introducing uncertainty, it is useful to briey review the properties of
the equilibrium when input costs are non-random and equal to ci for each
rm i. Firm is prot is:
C (qi; qj ; ci) = qi (P (Q)  ci) :
When no confusion is possible, we use the following shorter notation:
fi = f (xi; xj), i.e., fi is the value of function f (:; :) for rm i that plays xi
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while rm j plays xj . For example, Ci = 
C (qi; qj ; ~c). Then,
@Ci
@qi
= (P (Q)  ci) + qiP 0 (Q) and @
2Ci
(@qi)
2 = 2P
0
(Q) + qiP
00
(Q) :
Lemma 1 Assumption 1 implies that, for all (c1; c2) there exists a unique
Cournot equilibrium
 
qE (c1; c2) ; q
E (c2; c1)

. When this equilibrium is interior 
qEi = q
E (ci; cj) > 0 for i = 1; 2

, it satises
@qEi
@ci
< 0 and
@qEj
@ci
> 0
for i = 1; 2.
Proof. Condition 1 guarantees that @
2Ci
(@qi)
2 < 0. Thus, if a Cournot equilib-
rium exists, it is characterized by the necessary rst-order conditions:
@Ci
@qi
= (P (Q)  ci) + qiP 0 (Q) = 0: (2)
Assumption 1 guarantees that, for all c > 0, the equation
A (Q) = 2P (Q) +QP 0 (Q) = c
admits a unique solution QE (c). When the equilibrium is interior
 
qEi > 0 for i = 1; 2

,
the equilibrium quantities are:
qE (ci; cj) =
P
 
QE (ci + cj)
  ci
( P 0 (QE (ci + cj))) :
Finally, we verify that:
@qEi
@ci
=
@qE (ci; cj)
@ci
=
2P
0  
QE

+ qEj P
00  
QE

P 0 (QE)

3P 0 (QE) +QEP
00
(QE)
 < 0 (3)
and
@qEj
@ci
=
@qE (cj ; ci)
@ci
=   P
0  
QE

+ qEi P
00  
QE

P 0 (QE)

3P 0 (QE) +QEP
00
(QE)
 > 0: (4)
Thus, an increase in rm is marginal cost induces a reduction in its
Cournot equilibrium output qEi and an increase in the equilibrium output
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of its competitor qEj .
2.3 Uncertainty on input costs and risk management
We return to the random input cost case. Ex ante, the input cost ~c is a
random variable, distributed following cumulative distribution function G (:)
with bounded support C = [c; c]. C and G (:) are common knowledge to both
rms.
Firms can purchase input in the wholesale forward market at (forward)
price F . To eliminate speculative motives for hedging, we assume that F =
E [~c]. There are no transaction costs associated with hedging.
Firms do not exert market power in the spot and forward wholesale mar-
kets for input, even though they do exert market power in their product mar-
ket. For example, airlines do not exert market power in the fuel market, yet
they are an oligopoly on specic routes (see for example Gerardi and Shapiro
(2009)); food processing rms may not exert market power in the feedstock
market, while most empirical studies document market power in their product
markets (see for example Sheldon and Sperlings (2001) survey).
We also assume that rms choose their outputs (or prices) before input
costs are realized. This is the case for most manufacturing industries1: pro-
ducers (e.g., car manufacturers) commit to a product price or volume for the
relevant period (typically one or two quarters). During that period, input
prices (e.g., aluminum and steel prices) vary. This assumption also holds
for the electricity supply industry in the United Kingdom, where retail rates
typically change only 3 or 4 times a year, while wholesale power prices vary
continuously. This price inexibility could be due for example to the high cost
of adjusting prices, or simply to industry practices.
Two other assumptions are crucial for risk management to have any strate-
gic value. First, each rm must be able to publicly commit to its hedging
decision. Second, rms must be "risk averse", in the sense that shareholder
value can be measured by the expectation of some concave function of prot.
We now motivate these assumptions.
1This assumption does not apply to industries where output price is exible. For example
delivery services (e.g., Fedex and UPS) explicitly include in their published rate a fuel
surcharge schedule, that depends on the price of an oil index. Similarly, electricity suppliers
in Norway o¤er retail contracts explicitly adjusted to the wholesale power price.
When rms set production after the input price is realized, the prot from the hedge
is known before the production decision is made, thus has no impact on it. Firms cannot
do any better than standard deterministic prot maximization. Knowing that, when rms
make the hedging decision, they follow the "standard" one-rm risk management logic.
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2.4 Public commitment to hedging decision
We assume throughout this article that rms can publicly commit to their
hedging decisions (H1; H2) before they select their output (or prices). This
assumption can be justied as follows.
First, nancial regulations require rms to publish in their quarterly state-
ments a description of their portfolio of forward purchases and sales. While
some discretion still exists in disclosure, an outside party can get a close pic-
ture of a rms hedging portfolio. For example, Jin and Jorion (2007) were
able to compute the delta-equivalent of the forward portfolio for US oil and
gas companies. Also, as previously mentioned, electricity suppliers in Britain
infer each others hedging portfolio from nancial statements and other public
information.
Second, industrial rms can and in practice do commit to a hedging
strategy through their risk management policy. Forward sales and purchases,
that require the use of derivatives, are usually handled with extreme caution
by Board of Directors, concerned about potential speculative behavior by
traders. Boards then require management to dene and follow a clear hedging
strategy, often declining in time: for example "hedge fully our exposure for
the next quarter, hedge half of the exposure for the next two quarters, and
a fourth of our exposure for the quarter after". As mentioned earlier, this
strategy is communicated to investors and regulators. Management has then
limited discretion to deviate from this strategy.
Without commitment to hedging, no strategic interaction arises, i.e., there
exists a dichotomy between hedging and production. Suppose indeed that
rms select output, then hedge. Reasoning backwards, consider rst the hedg-
ing decision, once production is known. Since (i) rms are risk averse, and
(ii) there are no transaction costs nor expected gain from hedging (i.e.,
E [~c]   F = 0), full hedging is the optimal strategy. Consider now the pro-
duction decision. Knowing that input costs will be perfectly covered at the
forward price, rms play a symmetric Cournot game with constant marginal
costs equal to F , thus their equilibrium output is qE1 = q
E
2 = q
E (F; F ).
Thus, this article is focussed on situations where risk-averse rms hedge
before making their production decision.
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2.5 Objective function
At t = 2 (i.e., once the input cost ~c is known), the prot function of rm i
that has purchased forward quantity Hi at the forward price F is:
i =  (qi; qj ; Hi; ~c) = qi (P (Q)  ~c) +Hi (~c  F )
= qi (P (Q)  F ) + (Hi   qi) (~c  F ) :
The rst expression of rm is prots reects a purchase of input volume qi
at cost ~c, and prot (~c  F ) on each of the Hi units purchased forward at
t = 0. Alternatively, the rm can consider that its production cost is F , and
its exposure to input price uctuations is (Hi   qi).
To obtain a strategic impact of risk management, a crucial ingredient is
that rms be risk-averse. Thus, we assume that rms maximize some expected
utility of prots U (i) where U (:) is increasing and (weakly) concave. There
are several possible justications for this assumption. In the case of a small
rm, owned and managed by the same person, the objective of this owner-
manager is to maximize the expected utility of her wealth, the prot of the
rm being a large component of this wealth.
However, we are mostly interested in large rms, typically owned by a
di¤use population of small shareholders, and whose managers own only a
small fraction of the shares. If managers act in the best interest of diversied
shareholders and the stock market is frictionless, the objective should be to
maximize the expected present value of future prots, where the expectation
is taken under the risk adjusted distribution, which incorporates risk premia.
Such a framework is consistent with the Modigliani and Miller theorem, and
implies in particular that corporate risk management does not create any
value for shareholders.
A more realistic description of reality incorporates nancial frictions, typi-
cally in the form of a wedge between the costs of external and internal nance
(Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993)), transaction costs of primary security
markets (Décamps et al. (2011)), or agency costs (DeMarzo and Sannikov
(2006), Biais et al. (2007)). In each of cases, shareholder value (once rms
optimize their nancing and investment policies) can be represented as the
expectation of a concave function of future prots. Even when shareholders
are risk neutral (or completely diversied), nancial frictions generate risk
aversion in the (indirect) preferences of shareholders.
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This is why we represent shareholderspreferences by a concave function of
future prots, denoted U (). For simplicity, we consider a symmetric model
where U (:) is the same for all rms. We do not attempt to endogenize U (:)
by modelling explicitly the nancial frictions and the optimal nancing and
investment policies that give rise to this function U (:).
Consistent with the literature reviewed above, we further assume that
absolute risk aversion  () =

 U
00
U 0

() is non-increasing.
At date t = 0, the shareholder value of rm i is then:
vi = v (qi; qj ; Hi) = E [U ( (qi; qj ; Hi; ~c))]
=E [U (qi (P (Q)  F ) + (Hi   qi) (~c  F ))]
We look for subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage games played
by rms. We solve by backward induction: we rst determine the unique
second-stage equilibrium (q (H1; H2) ; q (H2; H1)), then insert its value into
vi to obtain the rst-stage payo¤ functions, denoted Vi = V (Hi; Hj).
3 Strategic use of hedging
3.1 Random input costs: an illustrative example
Before solving the general case, we illustrate the main insights using a simple
example: (i) absolute risk aversion is constant and equal to , which corre-
sponds to U (x) = 1  exp ( x), (ii) inverse demand is linear P (Q) = 1 Q,
and (iii) input cost ~c is normally distributed2, with mean F and standard
deviation . In this case,
v (qi; qj ; Hi) =E [1  exp (  (qi (P (Q)  F ) + (Hi   qi) (~c  F )))]
= 1  exp ( m (qi; qj ; Hi))
where
mi = m (qi; qj ; Hi) = qi (P (Q)  F )   (Hi   qi)
2 2
2
is the certainty equivalent of rm is prot. Maximizing vi is equivalent to
maximizing mi. Now,
2The support of the distribution of cost is not bounded. However, as we will prove below,
the main results still hold.
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@mi
@qi
= P (Q)  F + qiP 0 (Q) + 2 (Hi   qi) ;
and
@2mi
(@qi)
2 = 2P
0
(Q) + qiP
00
(Q)  2 < 0:
Replacing P (Q) by its expression, the rst-order necessary and su¢ cient
conditions characterizing the equilibrium are
qi
 
2 + 2

+ qj = 1  F + 2Hi (5)
for i = 1; 2, which yield the unique equilibrium for the second-stage game:
qi = q
 (Hi; Hj) =
1
3 + 2

1  F + 
2
1 + 2
  
2 + 2

Hi  Hj

for i = 1; 2. Thus, V (Hi; Hj) = 1  exp ( M (Hi; Hj)), where
Mi = M (Hi; Hj) = m (q
 (Hi; Hj) ; q (Hj ; Hi) ; Hi)
is the certainty equivalent of rm is prot in the production game (stage 2).
Now,
@Mi
@Hi
=
@mi
@qi
@qi
@Hi
+
@mi
@qj
@qj
@Hi
+
@mi
@Hi
=

qi P
0
(Q)
@qj
@Hi
  (Hi   qi ) 2

= 2

Hi  

1 +
1
(3 + 2) (1 + 2)

qi

:
The necessary rst-order conditions of the hedging game (stage 1) are then:
Hi =

1 +
1
(3 + 2) (1 + 2)

qi :
Since M is concave in its rst argument, these conditions are also su¢ cient.
Replacing qi by q
 (Hi; Hj) and solving for the rst period equilibrium yields
a unique solution which is symmetric:
H =
1 + 1
(3+2)(1+2)
1  2
3(3+2)(1+2)
qE (F; F ) ;
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where
qE (F; F ) =
1  F
3
is the unique symmetric equilibrium output if marginal cost is constant and
equal to F . Equilibrium output is then:
q =
1
1  2
3(3+2)(1+2)
qE (F; F ) > qE (F; F ) :
Some key features of the analysis are worth noting. First, v (qi; qj ; Hi)
is concave in qi, due to the concavity of the prot function Ci and to risk
aversion.
Second, the rst order conditions (5) of the production game can be rewrit-
ten as
2qi + qj = 1  bc(qi; Hi)
where bc(qi; Hi)  E [U 0 (i) ~c]E [U 0 (i)] = F + 2 (qi  Hi)
is the risk-adjusted expected marginal cost of rm i. It is increasing in qi,
decreasing in Hi, and lower than the expected cost F if and only if Hi > qi.
Equilibrium of the production game is the solution of the system:(
q1 = q
E (bc (q1; H1) ;bc (q2; H2))
q2 = q
E (bc (q2; H2) ;bc (q1; H1)) :
Finally, at the equilibrium, rms hedge more than they produce, i.e., H >
q, which yields a risk-adjusted cost lower than F . Thus, rms produce more
than if costs were non random (and equal to F ): q > qE (F; F ). Random
input costs lead to higher output and lower equilibrium prices.
As we will see in the remainder of this article, these features also hold
under more general conditions on utility, demand, and input cost distribution.
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3.2 Equilibrium of the production game
Consider now a general specication.
@vi
@qi
=E

U 0 (i)
@i
@qi

= E
h
U 0 (i)

P (Q)  ~c+ qiP 0 (Q)
i
=E

U 0 (i)
 
P (Q) + qiP
0
(Q)

  E U 0 (i) ~c
=E

U 0 (i)
 
P (Q) + qiP
0
(Q)  bc (qi; qj ; Hi)
where
bci = bc (qi; qj ; Hi)  E [U 0 ( (qi; qj ; Hi; ~c)) ~c]E [U 0 ( (qi; qj ; Hi; ~c))] = F + cov [U
0 ( (qi; qj ; Hi; ~c)) ; ~c]
E [U 0 ( (qi; qj ; Hi; ~c))]
(6)
is the risk-adjusted expected cost of rm i. v (qi; qj ; Hi) is concave in qi since
@2vi
(@qi)
2 = E
"
U
00
(i)

@i
@qi
2
+ U
0
(i)
@2i
(@qi)
2
#
< 0:
Therefore, if an interior Nash equilibrium

qi ; q

j

exists, it is determined by
the rst order conditions
P (Q) + qi P
0
(Q)  bc  qi ; qj ; Hi = 0 (7)
for i = 1; 2.
Before proving existence of a Nash equilibrium and deriving su¢ cient
conditions for unicity, we examine equation (7). The interaction between
hedging and production is channelled through the expected risk-adjusted costbc (qi; qj ; Hi), determined in equilibrium. If the rm produces one more unit,
it costs ~c in each state of the world. Shareholders value marginal cost using
the probability measure induced by their marginal utility of wealth U 0 (i) in
each state of the world, and not according to the physical probability measure.
From the perspective of rm is shareholders, the risk-adjusted expectation
of any random variable x (~c) is:
bEi [x (~c)] = E [U 0 ( (qi; qj ; Hi; ~c)) x (~c)]E [U 0 ( (qi; qj ; Hi; ~c))] :
The impact of qi, qj , and Hi on the expected risk-adjusted cost is sum-
marized in the following Lemma, proven in Appendix A.1:
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Lemma 2 For any (qi; qj ; Hi):
@bci
@Hi
< 0 and bci  F , Hi  qi: (8)
@bci
@qj
=  qiP 0 (Q) ccovi [ (i) ; ~c] ; (9)
thus: (
@bci
@qj
= 0 if  (i) is constant
@bci
@qj
< 0, Hi > qi if  (i) is decreasing
: (10)
Finally, for any (Hi; Hj),
@bc
@qi
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi

> 0: (11)
A marginal increase in hedging increases marginal prot when ~c > F ,
and reduces it when ~c < F . However, favorable realizations are weighted
by a lower marginal utility, hence, overall, the risk-adjusted expected cost
decreases. Thus, "ceteris paribus", increasing Hi reduces rm i risk-adjusted
expected marginal cost.
Dependency of bci with respect to qi and qj is indirect, channelled through
the marginal utility of prots. If absolute risk-aversion is constant, bci depends
only on qi and Hi, which yields a more familiar Cournot game. Otherwise,
qjs impact on bci depends on the sign of (Hi   qi ). Finally, at the equilibrium
output, expected risk-adjusted marginal cost is increasing.
We now turn to existence and unicity of the equilibrium of the production
game. Since we ultimately focus on symmetric equilibria (where H1 = H2 =
H, q1 = q2 = q, bc1 = bc2), we restrict our attention to the case where
jH1  H2j is small enough that the equilibrium of the production game is
interior.
(q1; q2) is thus a xed point of the function , dened from R2 into R2 by(
1 (q1; q2) = q
E (bc (q1; q2; H1) ;bc (q2; q1; H2))
2 (q1; q2) = q
E (bc (q2; q1; H2) ;bc (q1; q2; H1)) :
Proposition 1 For any (H1; H2) close enough to the diagonal, an equilib-
rium of the production game exists. If absolute risk aversion is constant, this
equilibrium is unique, hence determined by qi = q
 (Hi; Hj) for i = 1; 2: Fur-
thermore, a marginal increase in rm is hedging reduces rm js equilibrium
13
output:
@qj
@Hi
< 0:
Proof. For existence, we apply Brouwers xed point theorem to the function
. Since ec  c by assumption,
bc (qi; qj ; Hi) = E [U 0 ( (qi; qj ; Hi; ~c)) ~c]E [U 0 ( (qi; qj ; Hi; ~c))]  c
for all (qi; qj ; Hi). Thus, since
@qE
@cj
(ci; cj)  0 and @qE@ci (ci; cj)  0:
qE (bc (qi; qj ; Hi) ;bc (qj ; qi; Hj))  qE (0; c)  qE :
Thus, we can limit our search to (qi; qj) 2

0; qE
2
. Since qE (x; y) andbc (x; y; z) are continuous in all their arguments, and dened on a compact and
convex set of R2, Brouwer theorem guarantees existence of an equilibrium.
If absolute risk aversion is constant, we prove in Appendix A.2 that the
real part of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix
J (q1; q

2; H1; H2) =
"
@qE1
@q1
  1 @qE1@q2
@qE2
@q1
@qE2
@q2
  1
#
are negative, which implies that the equilibrium is unique. Finally, constant
risk aversion implies @bc@qj

qi ; q

j ; Hi

= 0 by Lemma 2. Firms play a familiar
Cournot game with marginal costs bci increasing in qi at the equilibrium, and
decreasing in Hi. We prove in Appendix A.3 that, since increasing hedging re-
duces a rms cost, it make her more aggressive, and reduces her competitors
output.
Amarginal increase inHi commits rm i to a higher output. This strategic
e¤ect can be understood through three equivalent intuitions. A rst intuition
is that a marginal increase in Hi reduces qj , thus increases q

i (since quantities
are strategic substitutes). A second intuition is that a marginal increase
in Hi reduces the risk-adjusted cost, thus increases qi . A nal intuition is
that a marginal increase in Hi increases the volume exposed to input price
uctuations (Hi   qi), thus rm i must increase qi to reduce this exposure.
3.3 Equilibrium of the hedging game
Suppose a symmetric interior equilibrium of the hedging game (H; H) exists.
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Proposition 2 1. A symmetric interior equilibrium is characterized by
the necessary rst-order conditions:bc (q; q; H)  F + P 0 (Q) q @qj
@Hi

(H; H) = 0 (12)
for i = 1; 2, where
@qj
@Hi
(H; H) represents @q

@Hi
(Hj ; Hi)

(H;H)
.
2. If absolute risk aversion is constant, hedging toughens quantity compe-
tition: through over-hedging (H > q), rms commit to higher equilib-
rium output than if marginal costs were constant equal to F
bc (q; q; H) < F and q > qE (F; F ) :
Proof.
1. For i = 1; 2 ,the rst-order conditions dening equilibrium hedging vol-
ume Hi are:
E

U 0 (i )

@i
@Hi
+
@i
@qj
@qj
@Hi
+
@i
@qi
@qi
@Hi

= 0
where i = 

qi ; q

j ; H

i

,@

i
@x =
@(qi ;qj ;Hi )
@x for x 2 fqi; qj ; Hig,
@qi
@Hi
=
@q
@Hi

Hi ; H

j

, and
@qj
@Hi
= @q

@Hi

Hj ; H

i

. Since @i@Hi = ~c   F ,
@i
@qj
=
P
0
(Q) qi, and @@qi

qi ; q

j ; Hi

= 0 by denition of qi , this condition
becomes
E

U 0 (i ) ~c

+ E

U 0 (i )
 F + P 0 (Q) qi @qj@Hi

= 0:
Dividing by E [U 0 (i )] > 0 and selecting Hi = Hj = H yields equation
(12).
2. Equations (12), and (8) yield:
@qj
@Hi
(H; H) < 0, bc (q; q; H) < F , H > q
Thus, at a symmetric equilibrium, equation (7) yields
P (2q)+qP
0
(2q) = bc (q; q; H) < F = P  2qE (F; F )+qE (F; F )P 0  2qE (F; F ) :
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Since

P (2q) + qP
0
(2q)

is decreasing by Assumption 1, this condition
is equivalent to
q > qE (F; F ) :
A marginal increase inHi has two e¤ects on rms i expected utility. First,
a direct expected cost e¤ect: the rm substitutes input at known cost F for
input at uncertain cost ~c. When taking the risk-ajusted expectation, this sub-
stitution is worth (bc (qi; qj ; Hi)  F ). Second, an indirect e¤ect, through the
change in the other rms production:

P
0
(Q) qi
@qj
@Hi

. At the equilibrium,
both e¤ects exactly cancel out for both rms, which produces equilibrium
conditions (12).
Thus, since
@qj
@Hi
(H; H) < 0 and P 0 (Q) qi < 0, rms set bcqi ; qj ; Hi  <
F . They over hedge, i.e., hedge more than their (anticipated) production, so
that their risk-adjusted expected marginal cost is lower than their "true"
expected marginal cost E [~c] = F . This then leads them to become more
aggressive, and produce more than if they were perfectly hedged.
Finally, combining rst-order conditions (7) and (12) yields:

P (Q)  F + qP 0 (Q)

(H; H) =

 P 0 (Q) q @q

j
@Hi

(H; H) :
for i = 1; 2. Comparing with rst-order condition (2) for ci = F , an additional
term

 P 0 (Q) q @q

j
@Hi

is added, that captures the strategic impact of rm
is hedging on rm js production decision, as in Fudenberg and Tirole (1984).
4 The case of price competition
We now study the case of price competition. An argument similar to the
one used for quantity competition shows that risk averse rms committing
to their hedging position before making their pricing decision constitutes the
only timing where strategic interactions arise. Since the analysis is technically
similar to quantity competition, results are stated briey, and di¤erences with
quantity competition are emphasized. In particular, we will see that the
strategic impact of hedging on price competition is exactly opposite from the
one on quantity competition.
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4.1 Demand and constant input costs
Consider two symmetric rms that compete in price. Firm i faces demand
Di = D (pi; pj), decreasing in own price and increasing in the other rms
price, and has constant input cost ci. With a slight abuse, we use the same
notation as for quantity competition. Firms i commercial prot is
Ci = 
C (pi; pj ; ci) = D (pi; pj) (pi   ci) :
Assumption 2 D (pi; pj) is such that, for i = 1; 2: (i) C is concave in its
rst argument:
@2C
(@pi)
2 (pi; pj ; ci) < 0 for all (pi; pj ; ci) ;
(ii) for all (ci; cj) close enough to the diagonal3, the pricing game with con-
stant costs ci and cj has a unique interior equilibrium
 
pE (ci; cj) ; p
E (cj ; ci)

solution of 
(pi   ci) @D
@pi
+D
 
pE (ci; cj) ; p
E (cj ; ci)

= 0;
(iii) prices are strategic complements:
@2C
@pi@pj
 
pE (ci; cj) ; p
E (cj ; ci) ; ci

> 0 for all (ci; cj) ;
and (iv) the own price e¤ect on demand is stronger than the other rms price
e¤ect:
@Di
@pi
+
@Di
@pj
 0 and @
2Di
(@pi)
2 +
@2Di
@pi@pj
 0 for all (pi; pj) :
Assumption 2 is met for example for a linear Hotelling demand:
Di = D (pi; pj) =
1
2
+
pj   pi
2t
;
in which case equilibrium prices are:
pE (ci; cj) = t+
2ci + cj
2
:
3As in the Cournot case, jc1   c2j must be small enough to avoid a corner equilibrium.
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Concavity of the objective function and strategic complementarity of prices
are met by many demand functions. Unicity of equilibrium with constant in-
put costs is required to establish unicity with stochastic input costs. We prove
in Appendix B.1 that when the own price e¤ect is stronger than the others
price e¤ect, an increase in one rms cost increases both prices:
@pEi
@ci
=
@pE
@ci
(ci; cj) > 0 and
@pEj
@ci
=
@pE
@ci
(cj ; ci) > 0:
4.2 Random input costs
Firm is prot for input price ~c is:
i =  (pi; pj ; Hi; ~c) = D (pi; pj) (pi   ~c) +Hi (~c  F )
=D (pi; pj) (pi   F ) + (Hi  D (pi; pj)) (~c  F ) :
The expected value for shareholders is
vi = v (pi; pj ; Hi) = E [U ( (pi; pj ; Hi; ~c))] :
As will be proven below, an equilibrium of the pricing game exists, and, under
certain conditions, is unique, hence of the form (p (Hi; Hj) ; p (Hj ; Hi)). The
expected value of rm i for its shareholders is
Vi = V (Hi; Hj) = v (p
 (Hi; Hj) ; p (Hj ; Hi) ; Hi) :
Now,
@vi
@pi
=E

U 0 (i)
@i
@pi

= E

U 0 (i) 

Di + (pi   ~c) @Di
@pi

=E

U 0 (i)

Di + (pi   bci) @Di
@pi

where
bci = bc (pi; pj ; Hi)  E [U 0 ( (pi; pj ; Hi; ~c)) ~c]E [U 0 ( (pi; pj ; Hi; ~c))] = F+cov [U
0 ( (pi; pj ; Hi; ~c)) ; ~c]
E [U 0 ( (pi; pj ; Hi; ~c))]
:
(13)
@2vi
@p2i
= E
"
U 00 (i)

@i
@pi
2
+ U 0 (i)
@2i
@p2i
#
< 0:
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Since v (pi; pj ; Hi) is concave in pi, if an interior Nash equilibrium of the
pricing game (p1; p2) (H1; H2) exists, it solves the system of the necessary
rst-order conditions:
 
pi   bc  pi ; pj ; Hi @D@pi  pi ; pj+D  pi ; pj = 0 (14)
for i = 1; 2.
As proven in Appendix B.2, the risk-adjusted expected cost presents sim-
ilar properties to the Cournot case:
Lemma 3 For any (pi; pj ; Hi):
@bci
@Hi
< 0 and bci  F , Hi  D (pi; pj)
and
@bci
@pj
=
@Di
@pj
n
(pi   bci) bE [ (i) (bci   ~c)] + bE h (i) (bci   ~c)2io :
Finally, for any (Hi; Hj):
@bc
@pi
 
pi ; p

j ; Hi

< 0:
The equilibrium of the two-stage game is then characterized as follows:
Proposition 3 1. For any (Hi; Hj) close enough to the diagonal, there
exists an interior equilibrium of the pricing game. It is characterized by
equations (14) for i = 1; 2:
2. If absolute risk aversion is constant, this equilibrium is unique, and a
marginal hedging increase by rm i reduces rm js equilibrium price:
@pj
@Hi
< 0:
3. If an interior equilibrium

Hi ; H

j

of the hedging game exists, it is
characterized by0@bc  pi ; pj ; Hi  F  
0@ @D@pj

pi ; p

j

@D
@pi

pi ; p

j
D  pi ; pj @pj@Hi
1A1A Hi ; Hj  = 0
(15)
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for i = 1; 2.
4. If a symmetric interior equilibrium exists, and absolute risk aversion is
constant, hedging softens price competition: rms under-hedge to com-
mit to higher prices than if marginal costs were constant and equal to
F : bc (p; p; H) > F , H < D (p; p), p > pE (F; F ) :
Proof. The proof follows the steps of Propositions 1 and 2. Details are pre-
sented in Appendix B.3. The risk-adjusted costs are bounded, thus the set in
which we look for a xed point is compact and convex in R2. Since all func-
tions are continuous, Brouwers xed point theorem guarantees the existence
of an equilibrium. If absolute risk aversion is constant, then Assumption 2
guarantees unicity of the equilibrium and the direction of the strategic e¤ect.
Equation (15) is derived similarly to equation (12). Comparison of equations
(15), (13), and (14) shows that hedging softens price competition.
Combining the rst-order conditions yields:
(p   F ) @Di
@pi
(p; p) +D (p; p)  @Di
@pj
(p; p)D (p; p)
@pj
@Hi

(H; H) = 0:
Hedging has indeed a strategic e¤ect, captured by the term
@pj
@Hi
. Publicly
keeping a portion of their input price exposure uncovered commits rms to
raise prices to reduce demand, hence exposure. This commitment then yields
a higher equilibrium price : p > pE (F; F ).
The direction of the strategic e¤ect is reversed compared to Cournot com-
petition: here, rms under-hedge, hence increase the equilibrium price. This
stark di¤erence is best understood by comparing the rst-order conditions:
bci   F + @i
@qj
@qj
@Hi
= 0
in the Cournot case, and
bci   F + @i
@pj
@pj
@Hi
= 0
in the case of di¤erentiated Bertrand. In both cases, when rm i increases
hedging, rm j reduces her strategic variable (quantity or price). If rms
compete in quantity, when rm j increases output, he reduces rms i prot
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
@i
@qj
< 0

, therefore, at the equilibrium, rm i hedges to set her risk-adjusted
expected cost below F , i.e., becomes more aggressive. Conversely, if rms com-
pete in price, when rm j raises his price, he increases rm i prot

@i
@pj
> 0

,
hence rm i hedges to set her risk-adjusted expected cost above F , i.e., be-
comes less aggressive.
5 Robustness of the results
Constant absolute risk aversion implies both that the second-stage equilibrium
is unique, and that hedging toughens quantity competition. These results also
hold (but are more di¢ cult to prove) if rmsabsolute risk aversion indices do
not vary too much. We derive in Appendix C some necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for these properties. All can be cast as an upper bound on @bci@qj
 = qi P 0 (Q)  bEi [ (i) (bci   ~c)] :
We observe that
bEi [ (i) (bci   ~c)] = jcov [ (i) ; ~c]j is bounded above:bEi [ (i) (bci   ~c)]  maxbEi [max (bci   ~c; 0)] + minbEi [min (bci   ~c; 0)] :
Since bci = bEi [~c] and bci   ~c = max (bci   ~c; 0) + min (bci   ~c; 0),
bEi [bci   ~c] = bEi [max (bci   ~c; 0)] + bEi [min (bci   ~c; 0)] = 0;
thusbEi [ (i) (bci   ~c)]  (max   min) bEi [max (bci   ~c; 0)]  (max   min) (c  c) :
Let R  (max   min) (c  c) be the maximum of
bEi [ (i) (bci   ~c)]. We
have:  @bci@qj
  qE P 0 (Q)R  qE P 0 (Q) (max   min) (c  c) :
Proposition 4 If the variation of rmsabsolute risk aversion (max   min)
is lower than a threshold, that depends on the convexity of inverse demand
P (:), the equilibrium of the production game is unique and hedging toughens
quantity competition. Specically, a su¢ cient condition for unicity of the
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equilibrium and
@qj
@Hi
(H; H) < 0 is
(max   min) 
8>>><>>>:
p
3 1
qE(c c) if P
00
(Q) > 0
2
p
3 3
qE(c c) if P
00
(Q) < 0
1
qE(c c) if P
00
(Q) = 0
:
Proof. Details of the proof are presented in Appendix C. We derive su¢ cient
conditions for each property, then we determine the highest upper bound such
that all three su¢ cient conditions are simultaneously satised.
If absolute risk aversion is constant, max = min, these su¢ cient condi-
tions are met for any inverse demand function and any bounded distribution of
input costs. If absolute risk aversion is not constant, these conditions provide
an upper bound on (max   min) as a function of qE and (c  c).
A similar analysis can be conducted for price competition, although results
are more complex in the general case.
6 Strategic incentive to commit to a hedging position
So far, we have argued that rms commit to their hedging strategy because
their Boards of Directors do not want them to speculate: risk managers are not
allowed to signicantly deviate from their pre-announced derivatives position.
This restriction has clear advantages in terms of monitoring the activity of
traders. What is the strategic impact of this commitment?
First, if rms hedge after setting prices (or quantity), they completely
eliminate their exposure to input cost. Conversely, when they hedge before
they set prices (or quantities), they keep a portion of their exposure open.
Their prots volatility is increased, hence, ceteris paribus, their expected
utility is decreased.
Second, if rms compete in quantity, commitment yields higher output,
hence lower price. Thus we expect commitment yields a Pareto inferior out-
come. On the other hand, if rms compete in price, commitment yields higher
price, and thus, if total demand is relatively inelastic (e.g., Hotelling compe-
tition), higher prots, which may compensate for the reduction in volatility.
In this Section, we rene this intuition. Consider a new game. The timing
is now as follows: at t = 0, rms either Commit (C) or Not Commit (NC) to
their initial hedging strategy. At t = 1, rms determine and publicly announce
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their initial hedging strategy. At t = 2, they determine and publicly announce
their output (or price). Finally, at t = 3, if they have not committed at t = 0,
they can modify their initial hedging strategy. Then, input cost is realized,
and prots are determined.
The expected utility of rm i that plays strategy Xi 2 fC;NCg while rm
j plays strategy Xj 2 fC;NCg is 
 (Xi; Xj)
To focus on the strategic impact of hedging, we continue to assume that
(i) there are no transaction costs associated with hedging, and (ii) the for-
ward price F as well as the expected spot price E [~c] are equal and constant.
Hedging before or after playing the product market game does not modify
the (expected) gains.
We assume that the equilibrium of the second stage is unique (this is
the case for example if rms have constant risk aversion), and that a unique
symmetric equilibrium of the hedging game exists.
Proposition 5 1. Not Committing cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
Whether rms compete in quantity or in price,

 (C;NC) > 
 (NC;NC) :
2. If rms compete in quantity, Not Committing is Pareto superior

 (NC;NC) > 
 (C;C) :
3. If rms compete à la Hotelling, have a constant absolute risk aversion,
and input costs are normally distributed, Committing is Pareto superior
to Non Committing

 (C;C) > 
 (NC;NC)
and is a dominant strategy

 (C;C) > 
 (NC;C) :
Proof. We rst prove point 1 if rms compete in quantity. Suppose rm 2
plays NC. If rm 1 plays NC, its expected utility is 
 (NC;NC). Suppose
now rm 1 plays C. At t = 3, rm 2, which did not commit, optimally selects
complete hedging, while rm 1 has committed to H1. At t = 2, both rms
select their output. Assuming the equilibrium (q1 (H1) ; q2 (H1)) is interior, it
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is characterized by the rst-order conditions:(
q2P
0
(q1 + q2) + P (q1 + q2)  F = 0
q1P
0
(q1 + q2) + P (q1 + q2)  bc (q1; q2; H1) = 0
At t = 1, rm 1 selects H1 to maximize Z (H1) = V (q1 (H1) ; q2 (H1) ; H1). If
rm 1 selects H1 = qE (F; F ), q1 = q2 = qE (F; F ) is a solution of the system,
hence is the unique equilibrium for H1 = qE (F; F ). It yields the expected
payo¤ 
 (NC;NC). When rm 2 does not commit, rm 1 can guarantee
itself at least 
 (NC;NC), thus 
 (C;NC)  
 (NC;NC). Then,
dZ
dH1
 
qE (F; F )

=E

U
0
(1)

q1P
0  
Q
 dq2
dH1
+ (~c  F )

= q1P
0  
Q
 dq2
dH1
E
h
U
0
(1)
i
since bc  qE (F; F ) ; qE (F; F ) ; qE (F; F ) = F . Then, since H1 = q1, @bc1@q2 = 0,
hence dq2dH1 < 0. Thus,
dZ
dH1
 
qE (F; F )

> 0, hence for " > 0 arbitrarily small,
Z
 
qE (F; F ) + "

> Z
 
qE (F; F )
  
 (NC;NC). Thus:

 (C;NC) > 
 (NC;NC) :
The proof of point 1 proceeds along the same lines if rms compete in price,
and is presented in Appendix D, along with the formal proof of the other points.
As expected, when rms compete in quantity, (C;C) yields lower price and
higher volatility, hence lower expected utility than (NC;NC). On the other
hand, if rms compete à la Hotelling, the expected prot increase compensates
for the loss coming from increased volatility, hence (i) Committing is Pareto
superior4: 
 (C;C) > 
 (NC;NC), and (ii) is the best response to the other
rms Committing: 
 (C;C) > 
 (NC;C).
The rst point is striking: even though both rms Non Committing is
Pareto superior for rms competing in quantity, an individual rm prefers to
Commit when the other one does not, since she can always do strictly better
than replicating the Non Committing outcome.
Thus, whether rms compete in quantity or in price, they have a strategic
incentive to commit.
4Yields a higher expected utility.
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7 Concluding remarks
This article examines how rms facing volatile input prices and holding some
degree of market power in their product market link their risk management
with their production or pricing strategies. This issue is relevant in many
industries ranging from manufacturing to energy retailing, where risk averse
rms decide on their hedging strategies before their product market strategies.
We nd that hedging modies the pricing and production strategies of rms.
This strategic e¤ect is channelled through the risk-adjusted expected cost, i.e.,
the expected marginal cost under the measure induced by shareholdersrisk
aversion. It has diametrically opposed impacts depending on the nature of
product market competition: hedging toughens quantity competition while
it softens price competition. Finally, committing to a hedging strategy is
always a best response to non committing, and is a dominant strategy if rms
compete à la Hotelling.
This work can be expanded in many directions. First, it would be interest-
ing to endogenize pricing exibility. We have assumed that industry practices
dictate whether prices are exible or not. This is true in practice. However, it
would be interesting to know under what conditions price exibility is indeed
an equilibrium outcome.
Second, it would be interesting to examine asymmetric situations, such as
when one rm is market leader and announces its hedging strategy before the
other, or when di¤erent rms have di¤erent costs.
Finally, it would be interesting to test empirically these modelspredic-
tions, in particular whether rms incorporate their and their competitors
hedging in their pricing strategies. The airlines industry appears to o¤er fer-
tile ground for such an analysis: airlines face volatile fuel cost, and appear
to have retained some pricing power, at least on some routes. Furthermore,
as evidenced by the rich academic literature on that industry (e.g., Carter,
Rogers, and Simkins (2006) and (Gerardi and Shapiro (2009)) data on prices
and hedging strategies are publicly available.
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A Quantity competition
A.1 Properties of the risk-adjusted expected cost (Lemma 2)
For any (qi; qj ; Hi),
@bci
@Hi
=
E [U 0 (i)]E
h
U 00 (i) @i@Hi ~c
i
  E [U 0 (i) ~c]E
h
U 00 (i) @i@Hi
i
(E [U 0 (i)])2
= 
E
h
U 0 (i)

 U 00(i)U 0(i)
@i
@Hi
~c
i
E [U 0 (i)]
+
E [U 0 (i) ~c]
E [U 0 (i)]
E
h
U 0 (i)

 U 00(i)U 0(i)
@i
@Hi
i
E [U 0 (i)]
= bEi  (i) @i
@Hi
~c

+ bcibEi  (i) @i
@Hi

= bEi  (i) @i
@Hi
(bci   ~c)
Then, since @i@Hi = (~c  F ),
@bci
@Hi
= bEi [ (i) (~c  F ) (bci   ~c)] =  bEi h (i) (~c  bci)2i+ (bci   F ) bEi [ (i) (bci   ~c)]
= 
bEi h (i) (~c  bci)2i+ cov [U 0 (i) ; ~c]  ccovi [ (i) ; ~c]E [U 0 (i)]

since bci   F = E [U 0 (i) ~c]E [U 0 (i)]   E [~c] = cov [U
0 (i) ; ~c]
E [U 0 (i)]
and
bEi [ (i) (bci   ~c)] = bEi h (i)bEi [~c]  ~ci =  ccovi [ (i) ; ~c] :
Since (i)  (:) and U 0 (:) are both non-increasing in i, and (ii) i increases in
~c if and only if Hi > qi, we have (i) cov [U 0 (i) ; ~c]  ccovi [ (i) ; ~c]  0, hence
@bci
@Hi
< 0, and bci  F , Hi  qi. This establishes (8).
Similar algebra yields
@bci
@qj
= bEi  (i) @i
@qj
(bci   ~c)
= qiP
0
(Q) bEi [ (i) (bci   ~c)]
= qiP 0 (Q) ccovi [ (i) ; ~c]
which establishes (9). (10) follows from (9).
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Finally,
@bci
@qi
= bEi  (i) @i
@qi
(bci   ~c) :
For any (Hi; Hj), the equilibrium

qi ; q

j

(Hi; Hj) of the Cournot game sat-
ises
P
 
qi + q

j

+ qi P
0  
qi + q

j

= bc  qi ; qj ; Hi :
Thus,
@
@qi
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi; ~c

= P
 
qi + q

j

+ qi P
0  
qi + q

j
  ~c = bc  qi ; qj ; Hi  ~c;
and
@bc
@qi
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi

= bEi h    qi ; qj ; Hi  bc  qi ; qj ; Hi  ~c2i > 0
which establishes (11).
A.2 Unicity of equilibrium (Proposition 1)
As mentioned in the main text, the equilibrium of the production game
(q1; q2) (H1; H2) is unique if the real parts of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian
J (q1; q2; H1; H2) are negative, where
J (q1; q

2; H1; H2) =
"
@qE1
@q1
  1 @qE1@q2
@qE2
@q1
@qE2
@q2
  1
#
:
This is an application of Lyapunovs stability theorem (see for example Khalil
(2002)). The eigenvalues are the roots of:
2   Tr +Det = 0
where Tr is the trace of J and Det its determinant. The roots are:
 =
Tr pTr2   4Det
2
:
If Tr2   4Det < 0, the two roots are complex and conjugate. Their real part
is negative if and only if Tr < 0. If Tr2   4Det  0, the two roots are real.
Tr +
p
Tr2   4Det < 0 requires Tr < 0. Then, it also requires Det > 0.
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Thus, we require Tr < 0 and Det > 0.
Tr =

@qE1
@q1
+
@qE2
@q2
  2

:
By denition,
qEi = q
E (bc (qi; qj ; Hi) ;bc (qj ; qi; Hj) ; Hi) ;
for i = 1; 2, thus
@qEi
@qi
=
@qEi
@ci
@bci
@qi
+
@qEi
@cj
@bcj
@qi
; (16)
and
@qEi
@qj
=
@qEi
@ci
@bci
@qj
+
@qEi
@cj
@bcj
@qj
: (17)
Thus,
Tr =
@qE1
@c1
@bc1
@q1
+
@qE1
@c2
@bc2
@q1
+
@qE2
@c2
@bc2
@q2
+
@qE2
@c1
@bc1
@q2
  2:
From Lemma 2,
 constant) @bc1
@q2
=
@bc2
@q1
= 0
)
Tr (q1; q

2; H1; H2) =
0@@qE1
@c1 
@bc1
@q1
+
+
@qE2
@c2 
@bc2
@q2
+
1A (q1; q2; H1; H2)  2 <  2 < 0:
We now examine Det (q1; q2; H1; H2).
Det=

@qE1
@q1
  1

@qE2
@q2
  1

  @q
E
1
@q2
@qE2
@q1
=
@qE1
@q1
@qE2
@q2
  @q
E
1
@q2
@qE2
@q1
  @q
E
1
@q1
  @q
E
2
@q2
+ 1
Substituting in @q
E
i
@qi
and @q
E
i
@qj
from equations (16) and (17), then simplifying
yields
@qE1
@q1
@qE2
@q2
  @q
E
1
@q2
@qE2
@q1
=

@qE1
@c1
@qE2
@c2
  @q
E
1
@c2
@qE2
@c1

@bc1
@q1
@bc2
@q2
  @bc1
@q2
@bc2
@q1

:
Substituting in @q
E
i
@ci
and
@qEj
@ci
from equations (3) and (4), then simplifying
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yields
@qE1
@c1
@qE2
@c2
  @q
E
1
@c2
@qE2
@c1
=
1
P 0 (QE)

3P 0 (QE) +QP
00
(QE)
 :
Thus,
Det =
@bc1
@q1
@bc2
@q2
  @bc1@q2 @bc2@q1
P 0 (QE)

3P 0 (QE) +QEP
00
(QE)
   Tr   1:
Then,
 constant) @bc2
@q1
=
@bc1
@q2
= 0
)
Det (q1; q

2; H1; H2) =
0@ @bc1@q1 @bc2@q2
P 0 (QE)

3P 0 (QE) +QP
00
(QE)
   Tr
1A (q1; q2; H1; H2)  1
> Tr (q1; q2; H1; H2)  1 > 1:
Finally, since the equilibrium is unique, it takes the form q1 = q (H1; H2)
and q2 = q (H2; H1). The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose q1 =
 (H1; H2) and q2 =  (H2; H1) constitute an equilibrium, with  (:; :) 6=
 (:; :). Then,(
q1 =  (H1; H2) = q
E (bc ( (H1; H2) ;  (H2; H1) ; H1) ;bc ( (H2; H1) ;  (H1; H2) ; H2))
q2 =  (H2; H1) = q
E (bc ( (H2; H1) ;  (H1; H2) ; H2) ;bc ( (H1; H2) ;  (H2; H1) ; H1)) :
If we switch H1 and H2, q1 =  (H2; H1) and q2 =  (H1; H2) is also an
equilibrium. Thus,(
q1 =  (H2; H1) = q
E (bc ( (H2; H1) ;  (H1; H2) ; H2) ;bc ( (H1; H2) ;  (H2; H1) ; H1))
q2 =  (H1; H2) = q
E (bc ( (H1; H2) ;  (H2; H1) ; H1) ;bc ( (H2; H1) ;  (H1; H2) ; H2)) :
Thus, q1 =  (H1; H2) and q2 =  (H2; H1) also constitutes an equilibrium,
which contradicts the unicity of the equilibrium. Thus,  (:; :) =  (:; :) =
q (:; :).
A.3 Impact of Hi on qj with constant absolute risk aversion
(Proposition 1)
Dene
 (qi; qj ; Hi) = P (Q)  bc (qi; qj ; Hi) + qiP 0 (Q)
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The necessary and su¢ cient conditions characterizing the unique equilibrium
of the production game are
 
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi

=  
 
qj ; q

i ; Hj

= 0:
Total di¤erentiation of the First Order Conditions with respect to Hi yields:8<:

 1
@qi
@Hi
+  2
@qj
@Hi
+  3

qi ; q

j ; Hi

= 0
 1
@qj
@Hi
+  2
@qi
@Hi

qj ; q

i ; Hj

= 0
;
where 8>><>>:
 1 (qi; qj ; Hi) = 2P
0
(qi + qj) + qiP
00
(qi + qj) @bci@qi
 2 (qi; qj ; Hi) = P
0
(qi + qj) + qiP
00
(qi + qj)  @bci@qj
 3 (qi; qj ; Hi) =   @bci@Hi > 0
:
Thus, assuming
 =  1
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi

 1
 
qj ; q

i ; Hj
   2  qi ; qj ; Hi 2  qj ; qi ; Hj 6= 0;8<:
@q
@Hi
(Hi; Hj) =   1(q

j ;q

i ;Hj)
  3

qi ; q

j ; Hi

@q
@Hi
(Hj ; Hi) =
 2(qj ;qi ;Hj)
  3

qi ; q

j ; Hi
 :
If  is constant, @bci@qj = 0, thus
 2 (qi; qj ; Hi) = P
0
(qi + qj) + qiP
00
(qi + qj)<0:
Then:
 =

2P
0
(Q) + qi P
00
(Q) @bci
@qi

2P
0
(Q) + qjP
00
(Q) @bcj
@qj

 

P
0
(Q) + qiP
00
(Q)

P
0
(Q) + qjP
00
(Q)

=

P
0
(Q) @bci
@qi

P
0
(Q) @bcj
@qj

+

P
0
(Q) @bci
@qi

P
0
(Q) + qjP
00
(Q)

+

P
0
(Q) @bcj
@qj

P
0
(Q) + qi P
00
(Q)

:
Since all terms in parentheses are negative,  > 0, thus
@qj
@Hi
=
@q
@Hi
(Hj ; Hi) =
 2

qj ; q

i ; Hi


 3
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi

< 0:
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B Price competition
Dene
 (pi; pj ; Hi) =
@D
@pi
(pi; pj) (pi   bc (pi; pj ; Hi)) +D (pi; pj)
where bci  bc (pi; pj ; Hi)  E [U 0 ( (pi; pj ; Hi; ~c)) ~c]E [U 0 ( (pi; pj ; Hi; ~c))]
is the risk-adjusted expected cost of rm i. Suppose a unique interior equilib-
rium of the pricing game (p1; p2) (H1; H2) exists. The rst-order conditions
characterizing the equilibrium are
 
 
pi ; p

j ; Hi

=  
 
pj ; p

i ; Hj

= 0:
Assuming
 =  1
 
pi ; p

j ; Hi

 1
 
pj ; p

i ; Hj
   2  pi ; pj ; Hi 2  pj ; pi ; Hj 6= 0;8<:
@pi
@Hi
= @p

@Hi
(Hi; Hj) =   1(p

j ;p

i ;Hj)
  3

pi ; p

j ; Hi

@pj
@Hi
= @p

@Hi
(Hj ; Hi) =
 2(pj ;pi ;Hj)
  3

pi ; p

j ; Hi
 :
where 8>><>>:
 1 (pi; pj ; Hi) = 2
@Di
@pi
+ (pi   bci) @2Di(@pi)2   @Di@pi @bci@pi
 2 (pi; pj ; Hi) =
@Di
@pj
+ (pi   bci) @2Di@pi@pj   @Di@pi @bci@pj
 3 (pi; pj ; Hi) =  @Di@pi
@bci
@Hi
:
:
B.1 Impact of ci on pEi and p
E
j (constant input costs)
Suppose rst the marginal costs are constant:
 E (pi; pj ; ci) =
@D (pi; pj)
@pi
(pi   ci) +D (pi; pj)
and 8>><>>:
 E1 (pi; pj ; ci) = 2
@Di
@pi
+ (pi   ci) @2Di(@pi)2
 E2 (pi; pj ; ci) =
@Di
@pj
+ (pi   ci) @2Di@pi@pj
 E3 (pi; pj ; ci) =  @Di@pi
:
Assumption 2 guarantees (i) existence and unicity of an equilibrium
 
pE (ci; cj) ; p
E (cj ; ci)

,
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(ii)  E1 (pi; pj ; ci) < 0, since 
C (pi; pj ; ci) is concave in pi, (iii)
 E2
 
pE (ci; cj) ; p
E (cj ; ci) ; ci

> 0
since prices are strategic complements, and (iv)
 
 E1 +  
E
2
  
pE (ci; cj) ; p
E (cj ; ci) ; ci

< 0
since the own price e¤ect dominates. Thus:
E =  E1
 
pEi ; p
E
j ; ci

 E1
 
pEj ; p
E
i ; cj
   E2  pEi ; pEj ; ci E2  pEj ; pEi ; cj > 0
and8>>><>>>:
@pEi
@ci
= @p
E
@ci
(ci; cj) =
@Di
@pi
 E1 (pEj ;pEi ;cj)
E
= @Di@pi
2
@Dj
@pj
+(pj cj) @
2Dj
(@pj)
2
E
> 0
@pEj
@ci
= @p
E
@ci
(cj ; ci) =  @Di@pi
 E2 (pEj ;pEi ;cj)
E
=  @Di@pi
@Dj
@pi
+(pj cj) @
2Dj
@pi@pj
E
> 0
:
B.2 Properties of the risk-adjusted expected cost (Lemma 3)
For any (pi; pj ; Hi) ; the same derivation as for Cournot competition yields:
@bci
@Hi
= bEi [ (i) (~c  F ) (bci   ~c)]
= bEi h (i) (bci   ~c)2i+ (bci   F ) bEi [ (i) (bci   ~c)] :
= 
0@bEi h (i) (bci   ~c)2i+ cov
h
U
0
(i) ; ~c
i
 ccovi [ (i) ; ~c]
E [U 0 (i)]
1A :
Since (i)  (:) and U
0
(:) are both non-increasing, and (ii) i increases in ~c if
and only if Hi > D (pi; pj), we have (i) cov
h
U
0
(i) ; ~c
i
 ccovi [ (i) ; ~c]  0,
thus @bci@Hi < 0, and (ii) and bci  F , Hi  D (pi; pj).
Similarly:
@bci
@pj
= bEi  (i) @i
@pj
(bci   ~c)
=
@Di
@pj
bEi [ (i) (pi   ~c) (bci   ~c)]
=
@Di
@pj
n
(pi   bci) bEi [ (i) (bci   ~c)] + bEi h (i) (bci   ~c)2io :
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Thus:
@bc
@pj
 
pi ; p

j ; Hi

=
 
@Di
@pj
(
Di
@Di
@pi
ccovi [ (i) ; ~c] + bEi h (i) (bci   ~c)2i)! pi ; pj ; Hi
Then:
Hi > D
 
pi ; p

j
, ccovi [ (i) ; ~c] < 0) @bc
@pj
 
pi ; p

j ; Hi

> 0:
Finally:
@bci
@pi
= bEi  (i) @i
@pi
(bci   ~c) :
Then,
@bc
@pi
 
pi ; p

j ; Hi

=

@D
@pi
bEi h (i) (bci   ~c)2i  pi ; pj ; Hi < 0
since
@
@pi
 
pi ; p

j ; Hi

=

(bci   ~c) @Di
@pi
 
pi ; p

j ; Hi

:
B.3 Characterization of the equilibrium (Proposition 3)
B.3.1 Existence and unicity of equilibrium of the pricing game
Since we ultimately focus on symmetric equilibria, we assume that jHi  Hj j
is small enough that the equilibrium is interior. The equilibrium prices are
therefore xed points of the function  dened from R2 into R2 by(
1 (p1; p2) = p
E (bc (p1; p2; H1) ;bc (p2; p1; H2))
2 (p1; p2) = p
E (bc (p2; p1; H2) ;bc (p2; p1; H2)) :
Since ~c  c by assumption,
bc (pi; pj ; Hi) = E [U 0 ( (pi; pj ; Hi; ~c)) ~c]E [U 0 ( (pi; pj ; Hi; ~c))]  c
for all (pi; pj ; Hi). Thus, since
@pE
@ci
 0 and @pE@cj  0,
pE (bc (pi; pj ; Hi) ;bc (pj ; pi; Hj))  pE (c; c)  pE
Since pi  0 by denition, we can limit our search for a xed point to the
compact and convex set
h
0; pE
i2
. Brouwers theorem then applies, and there
exists a xed point, i.e., an equilibrium.
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This equilibrium (p1; p2) is unique if Tr < 0 and Det > 0. Then:
Tr (p1; p

2; H1; H2) =

@pE1
@p1
+
@pE2
@p2
  2

(p1; p

2; H1; H2) = A (p

1; p

2; H1; H2) 2:
where
A =
@pE1
@c1
@bc1
@p1
+
@pE1
@c2
@bc2
@p1
+
@pE2
@c2
@bc2
@p2
+
@pE2
@c1
@bc1
@p2
:
@pEi
@ci
@bci
@pi
 
pi ; p

j ; Hi; Hj

=
0@@Di
@pi
2  E1 pEj ; pEi ; cj bEi h (i) (bci   ~c)2i
E
1A pi ; pj ; Hi ;
if  is constant,
@bci
@pj
=
@Di
@pj
bEi h (i) (bci   ~c)2i ;
thus
@pEj
@ci
@bci
@pj
=  @Di
@pi
@Di
@pj
 E2

pEj ; p
E
i ; cj
 bEi h (i) (bci   ~c)2i
E
:
Thus,
A (p1; p

2; H1; H2) =
0B@ @D1@p1 cE1[(1)(bc1 ~c)
2]
E

@D1
@p1
 E1 (p2; p1;bc2)  @D1@p2  E2 (p2; p1;bc2)
+@D2@p2
bE2[(2)(bc2 ~c)2]
E

@D2
@p2
 E1 (p1; p2;bc1)  @D2@p1  E2 (p1; p2;bc1)
1CA (p1; p2; H1; H2) :
By Assumption 2,
 
 E1 +  
E
2

(p1; p2; H1; H2) < 0 and

@Di
@pi
+ @Di@pj

(pi; pj) <
0, thus 
@Di
@pi
 E1  
@Di
@pj
 E2

(p1; p

2; H1; H2) > 0;
hence A (p1; p2; H1; H2) < 0, hence Tr (p1; p2; H1; H2) <  2 < 0.
We now examine the sign of Det (p1; p2; H1; H2).
Det =

@pE1
@p1
  1

@pE2
@p2
  1

  @p
E
2
@p1
@pE1
@p2
The same algebra as in the Cournot case yields
Det =

@pE1
@c1
@pE2
@c2
  @p
E
1
@c2
@pE2
@c1

@c1
@p1
@bc2
@p2
  @bc2
@p1
@bc1
@p2

  Tr   1:
Dene
B =
 
@pEi
@ci
@pEj
@cj
  @p
E
j
@ci
@pEi
@cj
!
:
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Analysis of the constant cost case yields
B =
1
(E)2
24  E1 pEj ; pEi ; cj E3 pEi ; pEj ; ci E1 pEi ; pEj ; ci E3 pEj ; pEi ; cj
  E2

pEj ; p
E
i ; cj

 E3

pEi ; p
E
j ; ci

 E2

pEi ; p
E
j ; ci

 E3

pEj ; p
E
i ; cj
35
=
 E3

pEi ; p
E
j ; Hi

 E3

pEj ; p
E
i ; Hj

E
=
@Di
@pi
@Dj
@pj
E
> 0:
Analysis of the risk-adjusted expect cost shows that, if  is constant,
@c1
@p1
@bc2
@p2
  @bc2
@p1
@bc1
@p2

(p1; p

2; H1; H2) =
bE h (1) (bc1   ~c)2i bE h (2) (bc2   ~c)2i
@D1
@p1
@D2
@p2
  @D1
@p2
@D2
@p1

> 0:
Thus, Det (p1; p2; H1; H2) > 0.
B.3.2 Equilibrium of the hedging game
Suppose a unique interior of the hedging game exists. For i = 1; 2, the rst
order conditions dening this equilibrium are
E

U 0 (i )

@i
@Hi
+
@i
@pj
@pj
@Hi
+
@i
@pi
@pi
@Hi

= 0:
where i = 

pi ; p

j ; H

i

, @

i
@x =
@(pi ;pj ;Hi )
@x for x 2 fpi; pj ; Hig,
@pi
@Hi
=
@p
@Hi

Hi ; H

j

, and
@pj
@Hi
= @p

@Hi

Hj ; H

i

. Since @i@Hi = ~c F ,
@i
@pj
= (pi   ~c) @Di@pj ,
and @@pi

pi ; p

j ; Hi

= 0 by construction, this yields:
E

U 0 (i )

~c  F + (pi   ~c) @Di
@pj
@pj
@Hi

= 0:
Dividing by E [U 0 (i )] > 0 yields
bci   F + (pi   bci) @Di
@pj
@pj
@Hi
= 0:
Observing that  
pi   bci + D@D
@pi
! 
pi ; p

j ; H

i

= 0
yields equation (15).
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B.3.3 Sign of
@pj
@Hi
with constant absolute risk aversion
 1 (pi; pj ; Hi) =  
E
1 (pi; pj ;bci)  @Di@pi @bci@pi < 0;
 2 (pi; pj ; Hi) =  
E
2 (pi; pj ;bci)  @Di@pi @bci@pj > 0;
and
 3 (pi; pj ; Hi) =  
@Di
@pi
@bci
@Hi
< 0:
Then:
 = E   @Di
@pi
bE h (i) (bci   ~c)2i@Di
@pi
 E1
 
pj ; p

i ;bci  @Di@pj  E2  pj ; pi ;bci

 @Dj
@pj
bE h (j) (bcj   ~c)2i@Dj
@pj
 E1
 
pi ; p

j ;bcj  @Dj@pi  E2  pi ; pj ;bcj

+
@Di
@pi
@Dj
@pj
bE h (i) (bci   ~c)2i bE h (j) (bcj   ~c)2i@Di
@pi
@Dj
@pj
  @Dj
@pi
@Di
@pj

> 0
Thus, at the symmetric equilibrium,
@pj
@Hi
(H; H) =
 2 (p
; p; H)

 3 (p
; p; H) < 0:
B.3.4 Equilibrium price
@pj
@Hi
(H; H) < 0, bc (p; p; H) > F:
Consider p (c) dened implicitly by
(p (c)  c) @D (p (c) ; p (c))
@p1
+D (p (c) ; p (c)) = 0
where @D@p1 is the derivative of D (:; :) with respect to its rst argument.
dp
dc
=
@D1
@p1
2 @D@p1 +
@D
@p2
+ (p (c)  c)

@2D
(@p1)
2 +
@2D
@p2@p1
 > 0
since @D1@p1 +
@D1
@p2
< 0 and @
2D1
(@p1)
2 +
@2D1
@p2@p1
 0 by Assumption 2. Thus,
bc (p; p; H) > F , p = p (bc (p; p; H)) > p (F ) = pE (F; F ) :
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C Robustness analysis: proof of Propositions 4
C.1 Su¢ cient condition for the unicity of the equilibrium of
the production game
We rst derive a su¢ cient condition for Tr (q1; q2; H1; H2)   k, for k 2
(1; 2). From the analysis above,
Tr (q1; q

2; H1; H2) =

@qE1
@c1
@bc1
@q1
+
@qE2
@c2
@bc2
@q2
+
@qE1
@c2
@bc2
@q1
+
@qE2
@c1
@bc1
@q2

(q1; q

2; H1; H2) 2:
Since

@qE1
@c1
@bc1
@q1
+
@qE2
@c2
@bc2
@q2

(q1; q2; H1; H2) > 0,
@qE1
@c2
@bc2
@q1
+
@qE2
@c1
@bc1
@q2
 2  k ) Tr (q1; q2; H1; H2)   k:
Since
@qE1
@c2
@bc2
@q1
+
@qE2
@c1
@bc1
@q2
=  

P
0  
QE

+ q1P
00  
QE

@bc2
@q1
+

P
0  
QE

+ q2P
00  
QE

@bc1
@q2
P 0 (QE)

3P 0 (QE) +QP
00
(QE)
 ;
the inequality is equivalent to:
 

P
0  
QE

+ qE1 P
00  
QE
 @bc2
@q1
 

P
0  
QE

+ qE2 P
00  
QE
 @bc1
@q2
 (2  k)P 0  QE 3P 0  QE+QEP 00  QE
The subsequent analysis di¤ers depending on the concavity of P (:). Suppose
rst P
00
(Q) > 0. Then,  

P
0
(Q) + qiP
00
(Q)

<  P 0 (Q). Since
 @bci@qj  P 0 (Q) qER, the left hand side is bounded above by

 P 0 (Q)
@bc1@q2
+ @bc2@q1
  2P 0 (Q)2 qER:
Since QP
00
(Q)
( P 0 (Q))  1 by Assumption 1, the right hand side is bounded below
by
2 (2  k)

P
0
(Q)
2  (2  k)P 0 (Q)2 3 + QP 00 (Q)
P 0 (Q)
!
:
Thus,
qER  (2  k)) Tr (q1; q2; H1; H2)   k:
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We now derive a su¢ cient condition for Det (q1; q2; H1; H2) > 0. From
the analysis above,
Det =  Tr 1+
0@ 1
P 0 (QE)

3P 0 (QE) +QEP
00
(QE)
 @bc1
@q1
@bc2
@q2
  @bc2
@q1
@bc1
@q2
1A :
Thus, since 
@bc1
@q1
@bc2
@q2

(q1; q

2; H1; H2) > 0;
@bc2
@q1
@bc1
@q2
<   (Tr + 1)P 0 (Q)

3P
0
(Q) +QP
00
(Q)

) Det (q1; q2; H1; H2) > 0:
The left hand side is bounded above by

P
0
(Q)
2  
qER
2
. The right hand
side is bounded below by 2 (k   1)

P
0
(Q)
2
> 0. Thus,
qER 
p
2 (k   1)) Det (q1; q2; H1; H2) > 0:
Thus, for any k 2 (1; 2) ;
qER  min
p
2 (k   1); (2  k)

) Det (q1; q2; H1; H2) > 0 and Tr (q1; q2; H1; H2)   k:
We choose k =
 
3 p3 = maxk2(1;2) minp2 (k   1); (2  k), thus, if
P
00
(Q)  0,
qER 
p
3  1

) Det (q1; q2; H1; H2) > 0 and Tr (q1; q2; H1; H2)   k:
The same derivations for P
00
(Q) < 0 yield
qER 

2
p
3  3

) Det (q1; q2; H1; H2) > 0 and Tr (q1; q2; H1; H2)   k;
and for P
00
(Q) = 0
qER  1) Det (q1; q2; H1; H2) > 0 and Tr (q1; q2; H1; H2)   k;
C.2 Su¢ cient condition for @q

@Hi
(Hj; Hi)

(H;H)
< 0
With a slight abuse, as in the main text,
@qj
@Hi
(H; H) represents @q

@Hi
(Hj ; Hi)

(H;H)
,
@bci
@qi
(q; q; H) represents @bc@qi (qi; qj ; Hi)

(q;q;H)
, and @bci@qj (q; q; H) repre-
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sents @bc@qj (qi; qj ; Hj)

(q;q;H)
.
Lemma 4 Consider a symmetric equilibrium, Hi = Hj = H, and qi = qj =
q (H; H).
P
0
(Q) @bci
@qi
+
@bci
@qj

(q; q; H) < 0, @q

j
@Hi
(H; H) < 0:
Proof. We rst prove that
P
0
(Q) @bci
@qi
+
@bci
@qj

(q; q; H) < 0) @q

j
@Hi
(H; H) < 0:
 = 1
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi

 1
 
qj ; q

i ; Hj
   2  qi ; qj ; Hi 2  qj ; qi ; Hj
=
0@2P 0 (Q) + qiP 00 (Q) @bci@qi2P 0 (Q) + qjP 00 (Q) @bcj@qj 
 

P
0
(Q) + qiP
00
(Q)  @bci@qj

P
0
(Q) + qjP
00
(Q) @bcj@qi
1A qi ; qj ; Hi; Hj
=
0BBB@
 P 0 (Q)

@bci
@qi
+
@bcj
@qj
  P 0 (Q)

+

P
0
(Q) @bci@qi + @bci@qj

P
0
(Q) + qjP
00
(Q)

+

P
0
(Q) @bcj@qj + @bci@qj

P
0
(Q) + qiP
00
(Q)

1CCCA qi ; qj ; Hi; Hj
Thus, 
P
0
(Q)  @bc
@qi
+
@bc
@qj
 
qi ; q

j ; Hi; Hj

< 0 for i = 1; 2)  > 0:
Thus, since  3 (qi; qj ; Hi) > 0,
 2 (q
; q; H) =

P
0
(Q) + qiP
00
(Q)  @bci
@qj

(q; q; H) < 0, @q

j
@Hi
(H; H) :
To complete the proof, we show that  2 (q
; q; H) < 0. Suppose  2 (q; q; H) >
0, then
@qj
@Hi
(H; H) > 0, H < q , @bci
@qj
> 0)  2 (q; q; H) < 0
which is a contradiction.
Reciprocally,
@qj
@Hi
(H; H) < 0, H > q , @bci
@qj
< 0)

P
0
(Q) @bci
@qi
+
@bci
@qj

(q; q; H) < 0
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Since @bci@qi (q; q; H) > 0 and
P 0 (Q) < 0,
 @bci@qj (q; q; H)
  P 0 (Q)) P 0 (Q) @bci@qi + @bci@qj

(q; q; H) < 0
Thus, from the previous Lemma, @bci@qj
  P 0 (Q)) @qj@Hi (H; H) < 0
)
qER  1) @q

j
@Hi
(H; H) < 0:
C.3 Global su¢ cient condition for quantity competition
Since
 p
3  1 < 1 and  2p3  3 < 1, the su¢ cient condition for unicity
of the equilibrium and
@qj
@Hi
(H; H) < 0 is qER   p3  1 if P 00 (Q) > 0,
qER   2p3  3 if P 00 (Q) < 0, and qER  1 if P 00 (Q) = 1.
D Strategic incentives to commit (Proposition 5)
D.1 Comparing 
 (C;NC) and 
 (NC;NC) if rms compete in
price
Suppose rm 2 plays NC, while rm 1 plays C. At t = 2, rm 2 chooses H2 =
D (p2; p1). At t = 1, rms simultaneously select prices (p1 (H1) ; p2 (H1)) that
solve: (
D (p1; p2) + (p1   bc (p1; p2; H1)) @D@p1 (p1; p2) = 0
D (p2; p1) + (p2   F ) @D@p2 (p2; p1) = 0
At t = 0, rm 1 selectsH1 that maximizes Z (H1) = E [U ( (p1 (H1) ; p2 (H1) ; H1))].
As in the Cournot case, if rm 1 chooses H1 = D
 
pE (F; F ) ; pE (F; F )

,
p1 = p2 = p
E (F; F ) is a solution of the system, hence the unique equilibrium.
Both rms receive 
 (NC;NC). Thus, 
 (C;NC)  
 (NC;NC).
Then
dZ
dH1
 
D
 
pE (F; F ) ; pE (F; F )

=
@D1
@p2
 
pE (F; F )  F  @p2
@H1
E
h
U
0
(1)
i
< 0:
Thus, if the rm hedges
 
1
2   "

where " > 0 is arbitrarily small, by
continuity, Z
 
1
2   "

> Z
 
1
2

. Thus, 
 (C;NC) > 
 (NC;NC).
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D.2 Comparing 
 (C;C) and 
 (NC;NC) if rms compete in
quantity

 (C;C) = E

U

(P (Q)  F ) Q

2
+ (H  Q) (!   F )

< U

(P (Q)  F ) Q

2

since U (:) is concave, and

 (NC;NC) = U
  
P
 
2qE (F; F )
  F  qE (F; F ) :
For x  0, denote
f (x) = (P (2x)  F )x:
Condition 1 implies that f (:) is globally concave and admits a unique maxi-
mum x dened by:
f
0
(x) = P (2x)  F + 2xP 0 (2x) = 0:
Then,
f
0  
qE (F; F )

=

 qE (F; F )P 0  2qE (F; F )+ 2qE (F; F )P 0  2qE (F; F )
= qE (F; F )P
0  
2qE (F; F )

< 0;
hence qE (F; F ) > x. Then,f
 
qE (F; F )

> f (q) since q > qE (F; F ) and
f (:) is decreasing for x  x. Thus:

 (C;C) < U (f (q)) < U
 
f
 
qE (F; F )

= 
 (NC;NC) :
D.3 Hotelling competition
D.3.1 Comparing 
 (C;C) and 
 (NC;NC)
Under the conditions of Proposition 5
bc (pi; pj ; Hi) =F + 2 (Di (pi; pj) Hi)
=F + 2

pj   pi
2t
+
1
2
 Hi

Thus, for i = 1; 2, the rst-order conditions (14) are
D (pi; pj) +
@D
@pi
(pi; pj) (pi  
 
F + 2 (D (pi; pj) Hi)

= 0
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,
1
2
+
pj   pi
2t
  1
2t

pi  

F + 2

pj   pi
2t
+
1
2
 Hi

= 0
, 
2 +
2
2t

pi  

1 +
2
2t

pj = t+ F + 
2

1
2
 Hi

which yield equilibrium prices for i = 1; 2
p (Hi; Hj) = t+ F +
2
2
 
1 
 
4t+ 2

Hi +
 
2t+ 2

Hj
3t+ 2
!
=F +

1 +
1
2a

1  (1 + 4a)Hi + (1 + 2a)Hj
1 + 3a

t
where a = t
2
. Thus:
@pj
@Hi
=
@p (Hj ; Hi)
@Hi
=   1 + 2a
2a (1 + 3a)
t < 0:
The rst-order conditions (15) become
2
 
D
 
pi ; p

j
 Hi+D  pi ; pj @pj@Hi
 
Hi ; H

j

= 0
since bci = F + 2 (D (pi; pj) Hi) and @D@pj (pi; pj) =  @D@pi (pi; pj) = 12t :
Consider now a symmetric equilibrium: Hi = H

j = H
, hence pi = p

j =
p. Since the equilibrium is symmetric, Di

pi ; p

j

= 12 . Thus, the rst-order
conditions (15) further simplify to:
1
2
 H = 1 + 2a
4 (1 + 3a)
> 0:
At the symmetric equilibrium, Hotelling equilibrium price is:
p = t+ bc (p; p; H) = t+ F + 21
2
 H

,
p   F =

1 +
1 + 2a
4a (1 + 3a)

t
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Thus,

 (C;C) =
1
2

1 +
1 + 2a
4a (1 + 3a)

t  
2
2

1 + 2a
4a (1 + 3a)
2
=

1 +
(1 + 2a) (3 + 10a)
16a (1 + 3a)2

t
2
:
If both rms play Not Commit, they fully cover their exposure at t = 3.
Knowing this, they play at t = 2 symmetric Hotelling game with constant
marginal cost equal to the forward price. Thus,

 (C;C) =
t
2
and

 (C;C)  
 (NC;NC) = (1 + 2a) (3 + 10a)
16a (1 + 3a)2
t
2
> 0:
D.3.2 Comparing 
 (C;C) and 
 (NC;C)
Suppose again rm 2 playsNC, while rm 1 plays C. We prove that 
 (NC;C) <

 (C;C). The equilibrium prices (p1 (H1) ; p2 (H1)) are given by the Hotelling
formula:8<:p1 = t+
1
3

2

F + 2

p2 p1
2t +
1
2  H1

+ F

= t+ F + 2t3a

p2 p1
2t +
1
2  H1

p2 = t+
1
3

2F +

F + 2

p2 p1
2t +
1
2  H1

= t+ F + t3a

p2 p1
2t +
1
2  H1
 :
Then,
p2   p1 =  
t
3a

p2   p1
2t
+
1
2
 H1

=  2t 1
1 + 6a

1
2
 H1

and
D1  H1 = p2   p1
2t
+
1
2
 H1 = 6a
1 + 6a

1
2
 H1

:
Thus, 8<:p1   F =

1 + 41+6a
 
1
2  H1

t
p2   F =

1 + 21+6a
 
1
2  H1

t
;
and
@p2
@H1
=   2t
1 + 6a
< 0:
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Maximization over H1 yields:
1
2t
 
p1   F + 2 (H1  D1)
 @p2
@H1
  2 (H1  D1) = 0
,
 

1 +
4
1 + 6a

1
2
 H1

t  2 6a
1 + 6a

1
2
 H1

2t
1 + 6a
+2t2
6a
1 + 6a

1
2
 H1

= 0
,
1
2
 H1 = 1 + 6a
4 (2 + 9a)
:
Thus,
p2   F =

1 +
1
2 (2 + 9a)

t;
and
D (p2; p1) =
1
2

1 +
1
2 (2 + 9a)

;
and

 (NC;C) =

1 +
1
2 (2 + 9a)
2 t
2
:
Thus

 (C;C) > 
 (NC;C)() 1 + (1 + 2a) (3 + 10a)
16a (1 + 3a)2
> 1 +
1
2 + 9a
+
1
4 (2 + 9a)2
()
(1 + 2a) (3 + 10a) (2 + 9a)2
36a (1 + 4a) (1 + 3a)2
> 1
which is veried numerically for all a  0.
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